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Introduction
Democracy is often regarded as a morally desirable system of government because it 
allows the constituents to influence the decisions that influence them. A citizen can make their will 
known for example through voting or by running for public office, and this influence gives the 
system legitimacy, by which I mean that it confirms to the highest possible extent to the principles 
of political equality and self-rule. Even if not every constituent will be satisfied with every decision, 
they are not without influence in the process of making that decision. A great deal has been written 
about exactly what procedures and values can make democracy more legitimate and effective at 
implementing self-rule, but it is interesting to note that on the whole an important aspect of 
democracy is taken for granted. The demos itself, those that belong to the people and make up the 
body of citizens, was until recently not in focus. Nonetheless, the demos is a relevant part of 
democracy, and is worthy of discussion because it faces a problem of constitution. 
The democratic process of citizens making their will known and so reaching a decision is 
what gives the system legitimacy. As such, to make the demos legitimate it simply needs to be 
formed through a democratic process. But when this is attempted we face a chicken-and-egg 
problem. To establish the demos democratically, a democratic procedure for establishment, such 
as a vote, must be enacted. The individuals that vote need to be part of a demos to legitimately be 
able to vote in a democratic system, but it is the very outcome of that vote that establishes them as 
a demos and allows them to vote in a democracy the first place. The infinite regress that occurs 
when trying to democratically constitute the demos is called the boundary problem (Goodin 2007, 
43). The boundary problem is poignant for democracy, because it is worrying that a system which 
gains legitimacy through democratic procedure fails to have a democratic answer that ensures 
political equality to its initial constitution. If the system cannot legitimise its own constitution, what 
makes its subsequent actions legitimate? Theorists have offered a number of solutions to the 
boundary problem that aim to democratically legitimate an initial demos or show why the problem 
is not as urgent as one might believe. I am most interested not in the theory behind these 
solutions, but in their practical application to democratic polities. I shall specifically address the all-
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subjected principle, one of the solutions offered to the boundary problem which maintains “that all 
those subjected to the exercise of political power be included in the demos, i.e., granted a right of 
democratic say over political decisions” (Abizadeh 2012, 878).
In this research project I shall assess the following question: “Assuming that the all-
subjected principle is the most appealing solution to the boundary problem, to what extent can 
different forms of political organisation implement this principle considering their founding 
principles?”. I will examine to what extent the principle can be implemented in three different 
systems: the Rousseauian city-state, the contemporary nation-state, and a form of global 
democratic government. Each of these has a different scope and thus different capacities for the 
implementation of the all-subjected principle. I mention the founding principles of these polities, by 
which I mean that the implementation of the all-subjected principle will be examined within political 
limits set by the system of government itself. It is thus my aim to practically examine the 
implementation of the principle from within the system. Considering I accept the all-subjected 
principle as the best solution to the boundary problem, the greater the extent of implementation, 
the more legitimate the democratic system becomes. I shall elaborate on this theory below. This 
query is relevant considering the effect of tackling the boundary problem. Unless the conclusion is 
that our current demoi are historically and democratically somehow fully legitimate, it may be 
necessary for our current system of political organisation to change. Because one cannot 
practically imagine a society or set up power-relations from a clean slate as philosophers are fond 
to do, it is a worthwhile pursuit to examine how a proposed solution to the boundary problem could 
be implemented in an already-existing society that currently does not implement that solution. 
Moreover, the greater the extent of implementation of the all-subjected principle, the greater the 
legitimacy of the system. If one system has a greater capacity for implementation than another, 
conclusions about legitimacy can be drawn from this. 
I shall begin by summarising the literature on the boundary problem and discussing some 
of its solutions. This will serve to contextualise the problem as well as offer an explanation why I 
believe the all-subjected principle to be the most suitable solution and warranted of practical 
exploration. I then discuss my approach and the all-subjected principle in more depth and briefly 
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outline the three polities. In the following three chapters I examine for each of the three chosen 
systems to what extent they can implement the all-subjected principle taking into account their 
founding principles, before discussing some implications of the all-subjected principle being 
implemented and concluding. I expect that the capacity of the nation-state to implement the all-
subjected principle will show to be minimal, while the Rousseauian city-state and global democracy 
have higher capacity for implementation. If that is indeed the case, elements of our contemporary 
states, which mirror the nation-state to some extent, may need to be changed to furnish the 
greatest possible legitimacy in the constitution of their demos.  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The Boundary Problem
For a long time, within democratic theory and political philosophy the study of democracy 
remained focussed on what exactly a democracy is or ought to be, how it functions or ought to 
function, and what role specific institutions play or ought to play. While topics such as 
representation, voting and elections took the spotlight, the issue of who represents, votes or elects 
was not given similar attention. That issue is very important to a democracy, because it must be 
known who exactly is part of the group whose preferences are being translated to policy. The 
question of the constitution of the demos is a difficult one for political philosophers and has led to a 
great amount of conflicting answers. In this chapter I shall give a sketch of the different opinions 
that exist about the problem of constituting the demos and the subsequent way philosophers try to 
solve the issue.
The constitution of the demos is the starting point of a democracy: without a people the rule 
of the people cannot exist (Whelan 1983, 13-16 and Goodin 2007, 42-43). Historically, the demos 
was considered simply to be bound by historical and national boundaries (Song 2012, 39-41). 
Those living in Spain constitute the Spanish demos, those in Serbia the Serbian demos. But this 
becomes difficult when one looks at certain historical changes. Did the Kosovar demos suddenly 
come into the world when Kosovo declared independence, or were its citizens always part of both 
the Kosovaran and Serbian demos? Is the part of the Spanish demos that feels Catalan misguided, 
or is there a separate demos without a state?  The democratic boundary problem comes to exist 
when we try to democratically demarcate the demos. It is not possible to constitute the electorate 
through a vote among voters who would be entitled to vote only by virtue of the outcome of that 
very vote (Goodin 2007, 43). But some form of legitimate demarcation must happen, otherwise the 
democratic project is doomed to fail. Logically the constitution of the demos cannot be the product 
of the same procedures that are used in a democracy after the constitution of the demos. It seems 
then that democracy is stuck in an infinite regress where a predetermined electorate is necessary 
to vote on what the electorate is to look like. To what extent this is a problem and opinions on how 
it should be tackled vary greatly among different authors. Most authors at least concede that the 
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exercise of political power (and thus the demarcation of the demos) must be based on some 
ground prior to democratic decision-making to circumvent the boundary problem, but what exactly 
this ground is remains debated. If a principle cannot be found to justify the initial constitution of the 
demos, it seems that even the most inclusive contemporary democracies are plagued by a non-
democratic, even arbitrary, constitution of their demos (Whelan 1983, 13-16). It should be noted 
that the boundary problem only applies to the initial constitution of the demos, after this has been 
established it is possible to reconstitute the demos according to democratic procedures. 
The supposed arbitrariness of the constitution of the demos leaves us with a question: if the 
demos is not constituted democratically, what effect does this have on the legitimacy of further 
democratic decisions? One of the possible answers to this is given by Habermas, who does not 
see the arbitrary constitution as a problem, but instead as an example of the future-oriented 
character of democracy. According to him, democratic demoi have a goal to, through democratic 
procedures and policies, continuously expand and include more and more disenfranchised groups. 
In this sense, democracy is a self-corrective learning process that edges ever closer to the right 
composition of the demos, as long as its members remain aware of the process and critically 
engage with it to ensure the values and principles remain intact (Habermas 2001, 774-776). 
Alternatively, it is proposed that democratic theory only offers guidance on the substance of 
democracy, and thus cannot properly answer the question of the constitution of the demos. For 
example, Schumpeter argues that every democracy excludes some potential participants from the 
democratic process, such as those below a certain age (Schumpeter 1976, 243-245). This is done 
on grounds that the existing members of the demos agree upon, and is therefore not a problem to 
the democracy. Schumpeter thus believes democratic theory cannot answer the question of 
boundaries, and we must simply accept the boundaries the system has set for itself. Näsström, in 
contrast, believes that the constitution of the demos should not be addressed as a simple historical 
fact, but instead must be prone to the same claims of legitimacy that regular democratic 
procedures are. If we regard the demos not as historically but as democratically contingent, we can 
ask different questions that bring the debate forward (Näsström 2007). 
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Habermas’ idea that a demos can constantly reconstitute itself and enfranchise ever more 
people in a self-corrective learning process as long as the principles of democracy remain intact is 
an attractive one for solving the boundary problem (Habermas 2001). Firstly because the boundary 
problem only problematises the original constitution of the demos: subsequent reconstitutions are 
not problematic if they happen in a democratic way. Secondly there is empirical evidence that 
some demoi have become more inclusive and enfranchising over time, for example trough 
universal suffrage. The idea is however complicated by the fact that we do not have objective 
criteria to determine exactly what the perfect demos looks like, or what actions or principles exactly 
guide it. So how would we know at what point the constitution is complete, and how would we 
judge whether we are on the right track during the process? Habermas posits that this can be done 
by reasonably appropriating the constitution and its history of interpretation (Habermas 2001, 775). 
If this is the case, the debates about political organisation and criteria for citizenship imply that not 
all states can do this to equal measure.  Moreover, if such a learning process would naturally end 
up at the perfectly constituted demos (whatever this may look like), it ought not matter how the 
original demos is constituted. It seems unlikely that whatever constitution we initially take, the final 
result would always be a right constitution of the demos, given for example that we do not have 
objective criteria to judge this. (Whelan 1983, 23-24). Schumpeter’s argument that every 
democracy has boundaries and that these should simply be accepted as long as the system’s 
procedures are democratic, circumvents the boundary problem altogether by seeing it as part of 
democratic practice. However, this leaves us with a very broad definition that allows totalitarian 
regimes such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union to be counted as democratic, which is a leap 
many theorists are not willing to make, and for good reason. Democracy is not only a set of 
procedures but also a concept that entails notions such as political equality and individual freedom, 
which are hard to rhyme with Schumpeter’s procedural definition.
Most solutions to the boundary problem are framed as prepolitical principles that can guide 
the establishment of the demos and democracy. For example, cultural-nationalism supposes that a 
shared culture comes into existence among people with shared beliefs and ideas (Miller 1995, 40, 
and Miller 2016, 45-47), and that this culture furnishes a prepolitical nation that gives the answer to 
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the boundary problem insofar that the legitimate demos consists of all those who share that certain 
nation’s culture and practices (Abizadeh 2012, 869-871). In that sense, the nation-states that exist 
do so because they are the vessels of a legitimate demos that shares cultural characteristics. By 
legitimate I mean adhering to democratic principles of of political equality and self-rule. Thus, the 
boundary problem is solved when individuals of a shared culture together form a demos. Generally 
those that lean more towards the cultural-nationalist line of thought often have fears that when the 
demos is constituted in such a way to include other citizens not of a similar culture, this will 
somehow impede or lessen the functioning of a democracy because the underlying values of a 
shared culture that made the democracy work are no longer shared by all members of the demos. 
The nation-state is based on a shared culture, its demos consists of those who belong to 
that specific culture and it is legitimate because this specific constitution of the demos gives a voice 
to the shared culture in the best way (Miller 1995, 40). Moreover, this solution to the boundary 
problem shares most characteristics with contemporary states, which will be discussed further 
below. Nation-states are generally understood to be carriers for specific peoples of a shared 
cultural background. This fact is evident in many political debates about norms and values, as well 
as cultural characteristics, such as the Dutch being pragmatic or the British loving their queen. It 
can be argued that someone who does not share these cultural values or holds values opposed to 
it, for example a person that favours republics over monarchies, would then not be a part of that 
culture’s legitimate demos (and most likely would not want to be). The assumption is that 
conflicting cultural nations that would exist within the same demos will inevitably lead to conflict or 
danger to the ‘right’ culture, something that is quite evident in the nationalist framing of political 
debates about for example immigration. However, as I have mentioned above the problem of 
secession movements such as the Kosovar case is difficult to answer from the point of view of the 
cultural-nation. 
Given the scope of this research project I shall limit my discussion of the cultural-nationalist 
principle only to the point of in what sense it is prepolitical and to the problem of cultural adoption. 
This first point relates in a broader sense to the difficulty of what can be understood as culture, and 
what specific criteria can be used to determine who is part of a culture and who is not (Abizadeh 
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2012, 869). There is a problem of closure, namely that there are no clear answers to either of 
these points. Simple identification with a culture is not enough to form a strong prepolitical ground 
for legitimacy, certain characteristics must be shared uniquely among members of a culture (Miller 
1995, 40). However, there are no two individuals ascribing to the same sub-set of ideas and 
practices that together form a culture, and overlap exists on all sides (Patten 2011, 736-737). If 
there can be no specific closure about what a culture entails and who is part of it, subsequently it 
becomes problematic to use culture to mark boundaries. The solution to this problem is often to 
ensure the survival of a culture as understood in a certain way by imposing it upon the selected 
demos via political institutions and laws (Fleischacker 1992, 167). But then we are faced with yet 
another problem, because the cultural nation becomes a political project to realise, as opposed to 
a prepolitical ground that can justify a specific constitution of the demos. (Abizadeh 2012, 872). A 
case in point here is Spanish law forbidding a Catalan referendum for independence, or similar 
cases in the United Kingdom relating to Scottish independence. That still leaves us with the query 
on what grounds the demos as it exists or as it is imagined by cultural-nationalists is legitimate. 
Because cultural-nationalism becomes a political project to realise, the grounds on which potential 
new members are selected and assessed become arbitrary as the outcome of that political 
process. Such a development also seems contrarily to democratic principles of political equality 
and solidarity, especially when considering its employment by totalitarian regimes or populist 
politicians. The fact that the constitution of the demos becomes a political project of the cultural 
nation erodes its justification as a prepolitical ground to solve the boundary problem, as that 
political project is exactly what ought to be justified, not affirmed. 
Song argues that democracy is more than just a procedural set of practices such as voting 
and representation, but also includes underlying principles and conditions such as political equality 
and solidarity (Song 2012, 41-48). In this view, an expanding demos poses problems of size and 
stability for the execution of democratic conditions and requisites, leading to the conclusion that 
there are democratic reasons (namely, the proper functioning of rule by the demos) for bounding 
the demos along territorial lines of modern states (Song 2012, 65). This argument is also implicitly 
made by cultural-nationalists. Miller makes it explicit as well: he believes there exists a line 
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between inclusiveness of the demos (favoured by liberal democrats) and the democratic 
performance of the demos (favoured by radical democrats) and suggests that the answer to any 
boundary problem must be determined by striking a balance between these two ends (Miller 2009, 
226-228). This is because Miller sees inclusiveness and democratic performance to some extent 
as contra-dictionary. If the demos expands too much, it cannot function, but he concedes a small 
and rigid demos may not legitimately function because of negative externalities. 
Territory is an implicit part of many arguments regarding the boundary problem, although 
several authors have focused on it more specifically. For example, territory can be regarded as the 
prepolitical homeland of a cultural nation as well as something that exists in conjunction with 
borders and therefore must be tackled accordingly in questions of demoi and boundaries (Miller 
2016). Espejo makes territory explicit by showing that many theories, whether globalist or 
nationalist, rely on a paradox of either a well-defined territory or a well-defined people. She argues 
that the focus of democratic theory must shift from abstract identity questions towards concrete 
institutions in concrete environments, and instead of look at whose interests are at stake, 
determine what those interests are and act in accordance with them (Espejo, 2014, 476). This will 
allow democratic theory to tackle the boundary problem and move past it towards solving concrete 
issues. 
Another solution for the boundary problem consists of regarding the demos more fluid or 
expansive than seen by the cultural-nationalists, or even unbounded altogether. Such a solution 
leads to the consideration of all those that are in some way impacted by a decision into the 
democratic process, because that way the rule of the people over the people is satisfied to the 
fullest. This way of thinking opposes the cultural-nationalist argument that a cultural nation forms 
the prepolitical principle to demarcate the demos (Abizadeh 2012) and likewise believes the 
answer to the boundary problem cannot follow the same rules as regular democratic decisions 
(Goodin 2007, 42). Instead, because there is no prepolitical ground other than justifying power by 
giving those impacted by it a voice in its execution, the demos must be constituted in the most 
expansive way (Abizadeh 2012, 876-878). Otherwise the risk exists that the autonomy of a person 
is negatively impacted without allowing them a say in the matter, which intuitively ought not to 
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happen in a democracy. This can possibly lead to a fluctuating demos that changes per issue 
voted upon (Whelan 1983, 19).  These ideas do not necessarily mean the system of states and 
territories must be overturned, but will require at least a significant change in our political practices.  
For example, enfranchisement can happen on a case-by-case basis, where the demos in each 
case is made up of individuals that can be part of different nation-states. 
The unbounded demos thesis is often presented as a dichotomy between nationalist and 
globalist thought, although those in favour of the expansive or unbounded demos do not 
necessarily propagate a global government or an unraveling of the current system of states. I will 
discuss two of the principles offered for constitution of the demos in this school of thought, namely 
the all-affected and the all-subjected principles. The first of these, the all-affected principle, entails 
essentially that “everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the right 
to participate in that government.” (Dahl 1970, 64). Moreover, it can be argued to in some way be 
implicit in the cultural-nationalist thesis. Goodin argues that lines on a map and feeling 
sentimentally attached to others are arbitrary facts from a philosophical standpoint. What allows 
these to become moral reasons for legitimately constituting a demos is the fact that they cause 
people’s interests to intertwine (Goodin 2007, 48). Goodin believes enfranchising all affected 
interests is likewise the principle by which other ways of constituting the demos are judged: the 
central question is is after all whether a constitution of the demos is good, that is, whether all those 
who ought to be included are in fact included. Moreover, it adheres to one of the central concepts 
of democracy: the potential of equal political power (Goodin 2007, 50). There are multiple iterations 
of this principle that range from weaker versions to the strongest version that includes all those 
possibly affected by any decision stemming from any possible agenda, effectively calling for a 
global demos. 
The all-subjected principle at first glance seems quite similar to the all-affected principle, 
but it differs on several important points. It is primarily heavily dependent on the notion of 
autonomy, and supposes those who are unilaterally subject to a coercive power that reduces their 
autonomy ought to have a say in government (Abizadeh 2012, 878). The all-subjected principle is 
necessary because the all-affected principle offers only an instrumental reason for 
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enfranchisement, not a constitutive requirement for democratic legitimacy, and as such does not 
fully answer the boundary problem. This is because the democratic ideal of self-rule is grounded in 
the fact that for individuals to be autonomous and equal they must be the joint authors of the terms 
governing the political power to which they are subject. One’s interests being affected at all does 
not mean impediment of autonomy or equality, but being subject to coercive power without 
influence over its exercise does (Abizadeh 2012, 787). A situation can be imagined where one’s 
interests are affected, but there is no unilateral application of coercive political power. Inclusion in 
the demos must not be based on the individual’s interests as a whole, but on their worth as 
autonomous and equal beings. This functions as the presupposition for democratic procedures 
required for democratic legitimacy. Moreover, because subjection is unbounded, it also implies the 
demos is in principle unbounded (Abizadeh 2012, 879). This is because the creation of borders 
and boundaries, both physical and political, affects not only those inside the borders through 
inclusion, but also those outside of the borders through exclusion (Abizadeh 2008, 54-56). Then, if 
those excluded are not given a say, all those individuals are impacted and thus unilaterally coerced 
by the drawing of a boundary, making whatever power drew that boundary violate the all-subjected 
principle and thus fail to some extent to be democratically legitimate. In turn, assuming the demos 
is bounded in principle makes legitimising power to those over whom it is exercised conceptually 
impossible, because a bounded demos per definition can never enfranchise all individuals over 
whom power is exercised. Thus, Abizadeh claims that the all-subjected principle is the only way of 
giving political power and its exercise over the demos legitimacy. Abizadeh believes essentially that 
we must reverse the question of the prepolitical principle, and accept political power as a given 
before looking how to legitimise it (2012, 879-880). An unbounded demos does not necessarily 
mean a doing away with current systems of state organisation, but it means that the solution to the 
boundary problem is one that furnished further critical reflection: there is not some kind of 
prepolitical demos to be found, but rather a normative question about which individuals are entitled 
to a say considering a certain set of institutions and power structures (Abizadeh 2012, 880-881).
The all-affected and all-subjected principles, and their implication that the demos either 
must be more expansive than it often is in contemporary states, or unbounded altogether, are not 
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without their criticism. It has been argued for example that an unbounded demos leads to 
neglecting of democratic values such as solidarity and equality. The fear here is that such an 
expanded demos will be unable to foster these characteristics in its members, or ensure the 
stability of the system (Song 2012). Furthermore, the all-subjected principle has been challenged 
based on the fact that it gives an equal voice to all, even if they are not subjected to the same 
degree as others. Then perhaps they should have some influence, but not necessarily an equal 
say in matters that subject them (Miller 2009, 224). This does however not conform to the principle 
underlying the unbounded demos: power is legitimate only insofar it conforms to the will of those 
subjected to it. If layers are created to demarcate degrees of subjection and corresponding 
degrees of democratic participation, a society fails to address the political equality of the members 
of the demos. 
An alternative to giving a plethora of people that are currently not in the demos a voice in 
the democratic process is the concept of compensation. This entails attempting to prevent as many 
negative externalities from befalling those not in the demos, but when they are unavoidable to 
compensate for them as a way to internalise the externality (Goodin 2007, 66-67). On the practical 
side of matters, it would greatly reduce the complexity for societies when dealing with several 
problems that would warrant enfranchisement at the same time. Especially when one accepts that 
there might be different demoi required for different decisions, compensation offers an easier way 
out. A given demos makes decisions to its best ability, and when negative externalities cannot be 
avoided, it compensates those impacted. The argument has also been made on the basis that 
expanding the demos to include all whose interests are affected fails to make a distinction between 
moral agents and moral patients (Saunders 2011). Moral patients cannot meaningfully partake in 
the debate, so it seems senseless to include them. Commonly young children are used as an 
example of this, but if the all-affected principle calls for the inclusion of an illiterate inhabitant of 
Nigeria in an American company’s decision that will harm the environment and have minor 
negative effects on that Nigerian, it can be doubted to what extent there can be meaningful 
participation. Then, demoi should do their best to limit the negative externalities they have on 
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others (even though they may at times have the right to do so), and when these cannot be 
avoided, to compensate for them (Saunders 2011). 
Some objections to the idea of compensation are straightforward. For example, who 
decided what kind of compensation is just and when it is necessary? Moreover, instances where 
compensation seems to be required will often feature unequal power structures: how would for 
example a Mexican fisherman that is impacted by US overfishing ever secure his compensation 
when his options to reach out are highly limited? Compensation is straightforward in the case of 
small infringements and damages, but when compensation has to be determined for the 
destruction of one’s ecosystem or social environment the matter becomes very complex. Finally, 
how would compensation be awarded for the negative externality of wrongful exclusion from the 
demos? (Goodin 2007, 67). 
There are several other (not necessarily democratic) ways of constituting the demos that 
have been offered in response to the question of who legitimately make up the people in a 
democracy. One of these can be found in contractarianism, where the demos consists of all those 
each of whom is not rejected by any of the others as a member (Whelan 1983, 24-28). While this 
circumvents the traditional boundary problem, it does run the risk of leaving large portions of the 
world without a demos, or fracturing demoi so far that democracy and political equality become 
difficult. One might propose that all those who are obliged to obey a collection of laws are entitled 
to membership of the demos that creates those laws (Goodin 2007, 42). However, when one 
considers examples such as underage children or illegal residents, who are bound by law but not 
part of the demos, or that of a day visitor, who is bound by the laws only for a single day, it 
becomes difficult to draw a line again, and we end up with just another version of the boundary 
problem. Finally, some just propose to accept demoi as they are now and not worry about the 
boundary problem. However, considering the impact of the boundary problem upon the foundations 
of democracy and the questions of legitimacy it poses, simply disregarding the problem as a whole  
is not an advisable course of action. 
To summarise, attempting to demarcate the demos in a democratic way leads to infinite 
regress, and there are diverse solutions proposed to address this boundary problem. In the 
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following chapters I shall assume the all-subjected principle offers the most compelling answer to 
the boundary problem and gives the most philosophically appealing ground for the constitution of 
the demos, while other answers fail to properly legitimise the exercise of power. Its 
enfranchisement of individuals based on their autonomy and political equality in a constitutive 
sense seems closest to the ideals of democracy, while it gives a framework to approach questions 
of the exercise of power. Cultural-nationalism in the end does not suffice as a prepolitical ground 
for the constitution of the demos because of its arbitrariness and final degeneration into a political 
project or imposition of culture. From this project follows a demos that is too easily based only on 
the whims of history. The all-affected principle is more appealing already, but is impeded by the fact 
it enfranchises moral patients. Likewise the criticism of levels of affectedness, while perhaps 
rationally refutable, shows us intuitively that excessive including individuals and the potential 
pitfalls of this remain matters that are difficult to solve for the all-affected principle. Compensation 
as an alternative for enfranchisement of subjected or affected individuals seems promising. It 
would reduce greatly the complexity of the democratic process compared to that of an expansive 
or unbounded demos. However, the question of who decides the compensation, as well as the 
difficulty of compensating for complex non-monetary negative externalities such as wrongful 
exclusion of the demos makes this solution very difficult. Finally, the solution of Habermas seems 
insufficient because it requires us to assume too much about characteristics of democracy and the 
way the perfect demos looks like, while Schumpeters answer requires us to leave behind almost 
fully the moral content of the concept of democracy as it is often understood. In the following 
chapter I shall further explain my understanding of the all-subjected principle, as well as outlining 
the central concepts that play a part in it. I shall moreover justify my chosen approach of three 
different types of government and the use of the all-subjected principle within these chosen forms. 
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On the All-Subjected Principle
As I have stated above, I believe the all-subjected principle is the most appealing solution 
to the boundary problem. By connecting democratic legitimacy to the exercise of power and the 
role that the subjected play in this provides us with a tool that can be used to assess to what extent 
a state is legitimate in the constitution of its demos. I shall first expand on the principle itself and 
the definition of subjection, before explaining how I intend to judge the implementation of the 
principle in different state-forms. 
In short, the all-subjected principle states “that all those subjected to the exercise of political 
power be included in the demos, i.e., granted a right of democratic say over political 
decisions” (Abizadeh 2012, 878). Abizadeh’s assumption that power needs not be prepolitically 
constituted (2012, 879) allows us to take the existence of political and the role individuals play in it 
as a starting point, instead of using an imaginary social contract that legitimises the constitution of 
the demos. Therefore, democracy is best understood as a system that attempts to legitimise the 
use of power over individuals, respecting their freedom and equality, by drawing on political 
practices of expression and deliberation (Abizadeh 2012, 880). This kind of practice serves the 
freedom and equality of those over whom power is exercised and gives the conditions for collective 
self-rule. Thus, certain normative constitutive constraints are necessary for the procedures and 
processes to articulate that collective self-rule (Abizadeh 2012, 880). This definition of democracy 
and the role the all-subjected principle plays in it does not presuppose a prepolitical ground that 
legitimises it. Instead, the democratic system and the people that are part of it are understood 
intersubjectively in procedural terms (Abizadeh 2012, 880). The legitimacy of the democratic 
system is then located in the regulative standards implicit to democratic procedures that make 
collective self-rule possible (Habermas 1996, 301). In turn, the unbounded demos that functions as 
a means to ensure legitimacy of the process through the all-subjected principle is a normative 
ideal; it is not ever fully represented by any actual collective, and none of the representations fully 
exhaust the normative aspirations of democratic legitimacy (Abizadeh 2012, 880). Following from 
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this, the legitimacy of systems is constantly reaffirmed by their ability to enfranchise subjected 
individuals into the demos.
When discussing the all-subjected principle it is imperative to accurately define subjection. 
Without a solid definition of the term it becomes unclear which individuals ought to be enfranchised 
in decisions. There is a close link between subjection, autonomy and coercion. Autonomy can be 
understood as a core principle of the democratic state (Abizadeh 2012, 878). I shall follow Raz’s 
definition of autonomy, which stipulates individuals being ‘part creators of their own moral world’ 
instead of ‘subject to the will of another’ (Raz 1986, 154-155). Autonomy has three requirements: 
that an individual 1) has the appropriate mental capacities to formulate personal projects and 
pursue them, 2) enjoys an adequate range of viable options, and 3) is independent, therefore not 
subject to the will of another or through coercion and manipulation (Raz 1986, 372-378). Then, 
individual autonomy is always invaded by coercion, which is why the exercise of political power 
demands a justification such as the all-subjected principle. I take it coercion consists of the 
exclusion of options that an individual might pursue, such as entering a territory or committing an 
act, or the threat of excluding options when a certain course of action is pursued, for example done 
by laws stipulating offences and punishment (Abizadeh 2008, 39-41). It is important to note that 
coercion is justified in democracy by and to the people over whom it is exercised by virtue of their 
democratic rights. Citizens are allowed to partake in the political process that creates the law, 
which in turn regulates the coercion a state applies to individuals. Through this process, while the 
autonomy of a citizen is still invaded by coercive state practices, it happens in part through their 
own will because of their right to participation in the political process, which gives the process 
legitimacy. The kind of subjection by the state that necessitates the all-subjected principle occurs 
when the autonomy of an individual is impacted by state coercion without influence in the process 
or justification of that coercion. In practice, this means that decisions that are currently often 
understood as purely unilateral, such as the drawing of state-borders, demand a greater inclusion 
of individuals into the demos. Overall, the all-subjected principle will mean greater enfranchisement 
of individuals and require actual demoi to be approached in a different manner compared to the 
current state-centric way they are often understood. 
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The way I will employ the all-subjected principle vis-a-vis the boundary problem is as 
follows. I will assess to what extent different organisations of the political can implement the 
principle to become as legitimate as possible, while taking their foundations into account. For 
example, in the case of the Rousseauian city-state, I shall ask how the all-subjected principle can 
be implemented to make the city-state as democratically legitimate as possible, accepting that its 
implementation may not violate the essence of Rousseau’s founding principles such as the 
establishment of the social contract. I have elected not to employ the all-subjected principle as a 
prepolitical founding principle for the demos, such as the cultural-nation discussed earlier. This 
would simply lead us to ask a binary question about each and every demos or state, namely “Is 
demos X constituted according to the all-subjected principle”?. If yes, it is legitimate, if no, it is not. 
Considering there is no demos organised in this way, this would not be appealing. Note that I am 
likewise not interested in the application of the principle in the different forms of organisation of the 
political, as this would lead to a similar question, namely “Is the all-subjected principle applied to 
democratic state X?” If yes, then it is legitimate, if no, then it is not. What I examine is the temporal 
application of the all-subjected principle to an already defined organisation of the political. That is 
to say, given the founding principles of the way a given demos is constituted, how can that demos 
become as democratically legitimate as possible by implementing the all-subjected principle? I 
believe it is relevant to observe these founding principles because these political entities exist 
defined by them while a major change in their founding principles is unlikely. That does not 
necessarily make them justified, but these principles are still something to take into account. 
Moreover, if their founding principles as such are not considered, each and every form of 
democratic government I could possibly propose would strive to implement the all-subjected 
principle to the fullest considering it will make their exercise of power most legitimate. Eventually 
this will cause all states to adopt a the same form, whatever their starting point. As this is likewise 
practically impossible, it is imperative to consider the potential problems that the justification for a 
state may pose to full implementation of the all-subjected principle. All the chosen forms of 
government have some kind of social contract at their foundation, and therefore can never fully 
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embody the all-subjected principle as I have described it. This is however not problematic 
considering my approach of the implementation, not the application of the principle.
The three ways of state organisation that I shall examine the implementation of the all-
subjected principle in are the Rousseauian city-state, the nation-state and a global democratic 
government. I have chosen these three because each operates on a different scale, namely the 
city-state on a small scale, the nation-state on a large scale, and the global democratic government 
on a global scale. Moreover, each has different founding principles or justifications for their 
formation, namely the Rousseauian social contract for the city-state, a form of cultural-nationalism 
for the nation-state, and the common denominator of humanity for the global democratic 
government. These founding principles or justifications together with their scale allow us to 
envision them in a certain way, as well as function to pen in the scope of possibilities for 
implementing the all-subjected principle. I shall explain how each of the systems handles this, but 
never to such an extent that the system would be changed beyond recognition. In short, they 
function as political demarcations, beyond which one system gives way to another. This way, it can 
be seen to what extent these systems can improve their legitimacy from within by implementing the 
principle to some extent without a major systemic change. As such it is expected that each has 
different capacities and hurdles for the implementation of the all-subjected principle. It does also 
mean that there is a possibility each of the systems only has a only a small capacity for 
implementing the all-subjected principle, warranting the conclusion that they can simply not 
become very legitimate from the point of view of the all-subjected principle. 
The justifications for the systems that I have mentioned above also give rise to a potential 
problem in my approach. If each of the systems I discuss has that discussion limited by their 
justifications which form part of the founding principles of that system, i.e. the Rousseauian social-
contract as a justification for the city-state, one might remark that implementation of the all-
subjected principle in each of these does not function, because that principle itself functions as the 
justification for a system. If one avoids this by looking not at the justifications of the system, but 
only at its scope, there will most likely not be any substantive difference in the capacity for 
implementation of the all-subjected principle between the three chosen options. Finally, looking at 
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existing states is also complicated, as these only mirror the nation-state I discuss in several 
aspects, while a Rousseauian city-state or a global democracy have not been attempted. To 
assuage this problem, I would like to remark that contrary to the justifications of the systems I have 
mentioned above, the all-subjected principle not necessarily makes demands of inclusion into 
states, but only of inclusion into demoi. It is a principle of democratic legitimacy, not of state 
organisation. While these are often similar and certainly related, they are not the same. The 
founding principles mentioned above all make some demands regarding what it means to be part 
of a given state. In the city-state, those part of the social contract must be part of the state, in the 
nation-state those who are part of the nation must be part of the state, and finally in the global 
democracy all individuals who are human must be part of the state. It is however not unthinkable 
that the all-subjected principle as I have described it can be satisfied when a subjected individual is 
included in the demos for the purpose of one decision, but never becomes part of the state for 
others. 
If a state would be organised based solely on the all-subjected principle, that will mean its 
demos will be different for every decision based on who is subjected. That gives no criteria for 
membership of the state. Are those enfranchised even once part of it? If an individual was 
enfranchised once five years ago, do they remain a citizen indefinitely? Using only the all-
subjected principle as guiding for the composition of the state will result in an entity that is hardly 
recognisable as a state by our current understandings. Thus, I believe there is still good reason for 
assessing the capacity for implementation of the all-subjected principle in the three chosen forms 
of government. Their justifications or founding principles will serve as limits to the enquiry and a 
theoretical framework at the same time. In connection to the theoretical justification I shall also 
discuss the effects of their scope. In the case of the nation-state I shall refer at times to 
contemporary examples, as the system as I will describe it shows similarities to current states. 
If a state shows little reception towards the all-subjected principle’s implementation, that is 
fails to implement it to a significant extent, instead of a demand for immediate political change 
something like the approach of values of democratisation may help explain the transition from one 
form of government to another. This essentially entails: “The core idea of this approach is that, 
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instead of treating democracy as an idealised set of institutions which need to be induced beyond 
the state, we should think about the fundamental principles that democracy demands and strive for 
them under existing conditions.” (Kuyper 2016). The all-subjected principle’s call for 
enfranchisement and legitimisation can be understood to be one of these principles, once again 
affirming that the all-subjected principle is not some rule for state formation, but a principle to 
ensure maximum democratic legitimacy within an existing demos.
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The Rousseauian City-State
When discussing the Rousseauian city-state I shall take it to mean a relatively small polity 
where Rousseau’s proposed form of general will formation is possible, constituted according to a 
social contract, where the citizens are each authors of the laws they are bound by, and which 
exists in a system of other such entities. The general will of the body of citizens is encapsulated in 
the Sovereign, and in each following the laws they themselves have authored and willed, they are 
free (Rousseau 2003, 8-9). These laws are general in application and universal in scope. From the 
universality of the law and the general will emerge laws that do not intrude upon or hamper citizens 
but instead favour the common good. In theory, the democratic procedures of the city-state 
function to reveal public interest, after which they facilitate a deliberative fulfilling of personal 
preferences and give legitimacy to the state (Bertram 2012). Rousseau’s city-state faces a similar 
paradox of constitution to the boundary problem, because he asserts that good laws stem from the 
general will of good and virtuous citizens. However, in order for citizens to become virtuous they 
must be shaped by good laws, so the initial citizenry of the city-state requires and external trigger 
in the form of the lawgiver to formulate good laws via the general will at the inception of the city-
state (Honig 2007, 3). I shall discuss this paradox and its implications for the city-state after some 
more general observations about the implementation of the all-subjected principle in the 
Rousseauian city-state. 
On the Social Contract does not say much about the constitution of the demos or the 
criteria involved in this. The initial discussion of the social contract implicitly treats the people as a 
given (Rousseau 2003, 8-12) One of the first arguments about the implementation of the all-
subjected principle that can be made is about the scope of the city-state in connection with the 
principle. After all, the city-state itself before it has come into any contact with outsiders or other 
entities of political organisation confirms fully to the all-subjected principle: all those who are 
subject to the law have their say in it. This is essentially the role of the Sovereign in Rousseau’s 
writings (Rousseau 2003, 11). However, once interactions begin to take place with individuals 
currently outside the demos or other entities of political organisation (such as other city-states), the 
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picture becomes more complex. We can assume that a good people that has willed good laws in 
the past shall, as a matter of general will, desire their system of government to be as just as 
possible, because this is for each a preferable situation. Seen like this, it can easily be imagined 
that the city-state would want to enfranchise a farmer living just outside the boundaries of the city 
in its decision-making, when a decision is made on the altering of the flow of a stream that runs 
through both their territories. This can likewise be the case when two separate city-states discuss 
their trade business, where each can influence the process and have a say in the final decision. 
After all, if city-state A adopts a policy regarding commercial rights of the merchants from city-state 
B without allowing that entity a voice in the decision-making, the merchants’ autonomy is 
negatively impacted through unilateral coercion and city-state A compromises its democratic 
legitimacy. A critique can be that the merchant can simply go elsewhere to avoid this coercion, and 
is thus not subjected. However, I envision the city-states to exist in a system with one another, and 
thus each of them will have laws relating to all others. In other words, city-state C and so forth will 
have trade policies as well. In that case, a merchant does not have a satisfactory range of other 
options for commerce where subjection would be absent, and as such the all-subjected principle 
would be violated if he has no influence on the formation of these trade policies. Other examples 
such as resident aliens and travellers can be solved likewise. 
The implementation of the all-subjected principle in the city-state can become problematic 
for two different reasons. The first of these is related in part to the formation of the general will.  
Because the law is universal in scope and general in application, citizens will create non-intrusive 
laws that secure the common interest, even though they do so by examining their self-interest. 
(Bertram 2012). Considering the city-state will enfranchise individuals through the all-subjected 
principle as I shall explain below, the process of discerning the general will by examining one’s own 
situation will become more difficult. Because the homogeneity implicitly assumed at the foundation 
of the city state is reduced by enfranchisement of different individuals, the city-state now contains a 
broader spectrum of ideas, beliefs and social standings. Thus, the demos can have more difficulty 
deducing the common good from the effect it would have on their own situation. Rousseau warns 
of factions in politics, which can be understood as stratified social classes (Rousseau 2003, 17-18). 
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Consider this especially in the case of less-visible minorities. Factions may lead to a degeneration 
of the quality of laws while the citizenry is no longer correctly able to discern the proper general 
will. Over time, this will further lower the quality of the laws created by the city-state as well as 
lower the ability of the citizens to discern the general will and make good laws, overall weakening 
the sovereign. 
The second problem likewise relates to the general will, but in this case the deliberation and 
action that give it shape and execute it. When the all-subjected principle enfranchises more 
individuals and the demos of the city-state thus grows when deciding on certain topics via the 
general will, direct deliberation to reach consensus and enact laws can become a difficult matter, 
both in spatial terms and in scope. A system of representation seems a likely solution to the 
problem of the demos being too large or spatially disconnected to convene in person to formulate 
and enact the general will. This, however, is not exactly to Rousseau’s liking, as giving away ones 
right to rule oneself to a representatives constitutes to him a form of slavery (Bertram 2012). The 
fear is that in a given situation where a large involvement of a legislative government is required 
eventually this government’s corporate will overrides the general will of the demos, at which point 
the Sovereign ceases to be legitimate because the people no longer live by the laws they author 
themselves (Rousseau 2003 41-42, 64-66). That does not mean any government in general ought 
to be opposed, for magistrates are necessary to administer the day-to-day affairs of the city-state, 
but relinquishing control of means to check the legislative is dangerous. 
It seems so far that the all-subjected principle and the Rousseauian city-state are difficult to 
reconcile. On the one hand, a larger demos would make both the creation of good laws and the 
effort of determining the general will, as well as the directness of legislation, more problematic. On 
the other hand one might argue that because of the initial limited size and scope of the city-state 
demos, the nature of decisions it must take will not cause massive subjection and thus 
enfranchisement of new individuals into the demos. Consider the aforementioned example of a 
Rousseauian city-state determining its trade policy towards another Rousseauian city-state. If this 
happens via a process of negotiating between the two city-states, the demos of each has had a 
democratic say through the general will in the final outcome and thus the all-subjected principle is 
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not violated. Other governmental interactions are likely to be of relatively small scale as well, which 
makes it easier to enfranchise the subjected. The interactions between the city-state and 
individuals are somewhat more difficult to interpret. As I have mentioned before, the city-state will 
at times make decisions that impact individuals that are currently not part of a city-state within the 
system. These individuals are thus part of the state of nature still while the demos of the city-state 
has left that mode behind. This means that the individual the city-state interacts with lacks the kind 
of moral freedom that the citizens of the city-state have acquired by being part of a social contract. 
The individual possesses only natural freedom, which the citizens have exchanged for civil 
freedom (Rousseau 2003, 12). Technically the individual living on that property has no right to it 
that the city-state can recognise because the individual exists in the state of nature (Rousseau 
2003, 12-14), and as such the city-state need not take them into account by the letter of the social 
contract. However, considering the nature of the social contract and that of the all-subjected 
principle does give sufficient grounds for enfranchisement. When the individual is enfranchised in 
the city-state, he acquires the moral freedom that allows him to obey laws that he has prescribed to 
himself. Rousseau’s state of nature is not as brutish as the Hobbesian account, but it still seems 
likely that the security brought by enfranchisement in the city-state is a sufficient motivation to 
accept enfranchisement. Enfranchisement of individuals that are not yet part of the Rousseauian 
city-state via the all-subjected principle seems quite close to the initial establishment of the city-
state via the social contract: all individuals that before faced the state of nature will rationally agree 
to the establishment of the city-state, and those that are enfranchised after will most likely agree to 
become part of its demos. It is important to note that if an individual refuses enfranchisement for 
whatever reason, such as in the aforementioned example of a discussion about a stream going 
through their territory, the city-state cannot force that person to become enfranchised. Agreement 
between the two parties without enfranchisement may still be possible, but the spirit of the all-
subjected principle prevents forceful inclusion into the demos.
The only type of significant decision taken by a city-state that may warrant enfranchisement 
of a larger group of people is that of border relations with other city-states. When enfranchisement 
of individuals living on certain lands outside the city-state occurs, these individuals become citizens 
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and thus gain the right to the territory they live on. This is as it used to be, except for their right to it 
is now protected by the Sovereign, and thus forms part of the city-state (Rousseau 2003, 12-13). 
Through this process individual enfranchisement and thus growth of the city-state continues until a 
neighbouring state is met. At this point the border that is drawn between the two states must allow 
the citizens of either state a voice in the discussion to safeguard the implementation of the all-
subjected principle. Considering the general will that is carried out by the government of both city-
states is each formulated by all citizens of both, any negotiation or other bilateral solution to the 
problem thus satisfies the implementation of the all-subjected principle. 
The aforementioned constitutional paradox of the lawgiver, where the inception of the city-
state faces a chicken-and-egg problem, coupled with the distinction between the general will on the 
one hand and the will of all, or aggregate of individual wills, on the other hand can be seen as 
Rousseau’s political paradox (Honig 2007, 3-8). It is important to know that, according to Honig, 
this paradox is not simply a binary irreducible fact or a solvable problem, but instead a vicious 
cycle that appears not only at the constitution of the city-state, but throughout democratic politics 
(2007, 3-5). Contrary to deliberative democracy or decisionism, the paradox of politics leaves us 
with a people that are a multitude and a general will not as infallible as Rousseau presents it, the 
result of the paradox finally being that the legitimacy of outcomes remains contestable. Different 
groups have different claims, the general will is inhabited by the will of all, and neither the lawgiver 
nor political theorists can be fully objective in standards (Honig 2007, 14). This conclusion warrants 
the approach for the all-subjected principle’s implementation that I have chosen. Instead of viewing 
the boundary problem and its solution as a binary and linear conundrum, by which I mean having a 
problem at the beginning and applying a process which ultimately leads to a solution, examining to 
what extent the principle can be implemented in a given political system to make it more legitimate 
is likewise practically usable. It supplies one not with ideal-theory or standard practices, but 
challenges one instead to find material conditions of political practices, which is exactly what Honig 
tries to achieve. 
In review, the Rousseauian city-state shows difficulties in constitution that are similar to the 
boundary problem. There exists a paradox of politics that Rousseau attempts to solve via the 
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lawgiver, but the paradox is better understood as a continuous contentious process without a linear 
answer (Honig 2007). In this sense, it is similar to the implementation of the all-subjected principle, 
because no actual demos can ever fully represent the normative demos in a perfect democratic 
system. The all-subjected principle and the constitution of the city-state by the social contract have 
similarities, and good citizens of a well-functioning city-state will want their laws to be as legitimate 
as possible, which is done by enfranchising all subjected individuals. For the enfranchised 
individuals the rational choice is to become part of the demos and thus the Sovereign while gaining 
moral freedom. Moreover, a city-state within a system of other city-states will most likely not make 
decisions with externalities so large that they require enfranchisement of large groups of 
individuals, and the decisions that do, such as border politics and trade can be solved easily by 
negotiation. In contrast, it can be argued that enfranchisement of individuals will over time make 
the discerning of the general will more difficult for the citizenry because they cannot use their own 
situation as basis for this as much. Likewise, enfranchisement of subjected individuals may over 
time create the need for a system of representation, which over time may further weaken the ability 
of citizens to be the authors of the laws that govern them. These problems are likely to occur to 
some extent when the all-subjected principle is practiced in the Rousseauian city-state, with their 
magnitude depending on the need and scope of enfranchisement of individuals into the demos. 
However, because the enfranchisement of individuals will most likely be limited to accepting new 
individuals not yet part of a Sovereign into the city-state while ensuring enfranchisement of 
neighbours through negotiation, the negative effects upon the city-state are minimal. Therefore, the 
implementation of the all-subjected principle within the Rousseauian city-state while respecting its 
founding principles is possible to a large extent. 
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The Nation-State
After having examined the implementation of the all-subjected principle to the Rousseauian 
city-state, I shall now examine how it can be implemented in the context of a democratic nation-
state. The nation presupposes a people, and uses that people as a justification for the drawing of 
boundaries around a political entity (Miller 2016, 45-49). Considering the rejection of the cultural-
nationalist prepolitical ground for the solving of the boundary problem above, this may seem odd. 
Nonetheless, the nation-state as I describe it here comes closest to actual democratic states of the 
three discussed systems,, so it is relevant to see to what extent the all-subjected principle can be 
implemented here to make the nation-state democratically legitimate to the greatest extent. 
My understanding of the nation-state entails a sovereign state inhabited mainly by 
individuals sharing a nationality, as well as a language and common characteristics. This definition 
is deliberately vague to avoid once again engaging in the debate about the philosophical 
underpinning of the nation-state as I have done before. For now this definition suffices to describe 
the way our current state system is broadly understood by many of its members; the Swiss live 
mainly in Switzerland according to Swiss culture, while the French mainly live in France according 
to French culture. While many contemporary states are to some degree pluralistic, the idea of 
nationhood remains important. Of course, such ideas are created by imagined communities that 
are not grounded in natural facts about the world (Anderson 1991, 6-7). Nation-states exist in a 
system of other nation-states where each has both internal sovereignty, meaning that the nation-
state has prime authority within its territory (Bull 1977, 8), as well as external sovereignty, meaning 
independence from outside higher authority (Bull 1977, 8). Its inhabitants are bound by laws and 
protected from violence because the nation-state employs a monopoly on violence. Moreover, 
citizens pay taxes that allow the state to finance programs that are thought to be in the general 
interest of all. Usually, the democratic systems are those of representation, where citizens can 
express their preference for a party or a candidate that matches their policy views. 
In comparison to the Rousseauian city-state, the nation-state faces several problems that 
make enfranchisement of subjected individuals more difficult. The first and perhaps most obvious 
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problem is that of nationality and belonging. Almost everything in nation-states is framed from the 
viewpoint of that nation in a particularist way, the national self versus the external other (Abizadeh 
2005, 45). This does not mean a nation-state cannot have pluralist or universal elements, it simply 
means that a nation-state defines itself contrasted to other nation-states. Many debates about 
migration or topics that transcend the nation-state would be approached from the point of view of 
the own nation; migration will bring in people with a different culture which lessens the strength of 
the nation, because the larger the demos and the less homogeneous the culture, the less 
necessary conditions for democracy to function such as solidarity are present. To some extent, the 
political thought of nationalism mirrors this in many contemporary states, and political parties of this 
sort often are against policies that increase heterogeneity of the demos. Not just the framing of 
political interactions is focussed on the nation, processes within the nation-state are also tied to 
nationhood. An example is the ties between nationhood and citizenship. This is visible in 
contemporary states as well. For example, in order to become a Dutch citizen, one must not only 
go through a legal process of acquiring citizenship, but also demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of 
Dutch culture and affiliation with it. This is the case in many states, where in order to become a 
citizen one must to some extent also become a national. It seems that this mindset and the 
administrative system that support it impact the degree to which the all-subjected principle can be 
implemented in a given nation-state. The all-subjected principle will call for enfranchisement of 
nationals of another nation-state, or those belonging to none or a nation-state that has ceased to 
function. That very idea is problematic for the nation-state. While the nation-state is mainly a 
system of political organisation, the nation it leans on often has implicit assumptions for 
membership. These often deal with culture and belonging, and make certain demands of the 
demos. The fact that the nation-state makes implicit demands of the demos makes implementation 
of the all-subjected principle difficult, as that principle makes different demands of the demos. This 
is another difference with the Rousseauian city-state, where full implementation of the principle 
would mean all individuals not yet part of one become part of a Sovereign eventually, because it 
has no demands of the demos other than acceptance of the social-contract, which is compatible 
with the all-subjected principle. In the international system of nation-states, whenever an individual 
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that is not part of a state is subject to the implementation of political power, they cannot be 
immediately enfranchised because entry requirements to nation-states are more stringent than in 
the case of the Rousseauian city-state. Recall that because the actual collective of individuals is 
only a representation of the normative demos that is part of the theoretical legitimisation of 
democracy (Abizadeh 2012, 880), it is not a problem for an individual to be part of the demos of 
two different nation-states at a given time. Moreover, because of the unboundedness of the 
normative demos it is questionable to what extent they are even two distinct demoi more than two 
parts of the same normative demos. 
A second remark that can be made about the compatibility of the all-subjected principle and 
the nation-state deals with the principles of democracy and their functioning in an expanded 
demos. I have mentioned before that some argue democracy is not only a set of procedures but 
also a collection of normative ideals such as political equality and solidarity (Song 2012 and Miller 
2009). Seen from this perspective, the nation-state is not simply what happens to be the vessel of 
contemporary democracy, but also a normatively desirable concept. When enfranchising all 
subjected individuals, democracy runs into problems of size and stability which are ultimately 
detrimental to it and achieve an opposite effect: democracy becomes less legitimate and capable 
of ensuring freedom and equality for citizens. Firstly, to the criticism that shifting demoi would have 
a hard time gathering the necessary information and expertise to make an informed decision as 
well as pessimism about their general capabilities in large groups I am inclined to answer that a 
different system of democracy will allow individuals to adapt and improve their participatory 
manners, making the system function (Pateman 2012). Secondly, the fear that an unbounded 
demos or its derivatives would be unable to configure enough solidarity and political equality to 
ensure proper democratic practice I think once again is underscored by the thought of a prepolitical 
nation that exists. In times of globalisation the potential differences between a Danish and a Swiss 
expatriate can be greater than those between the Danish expatriate and a Danish farmer simply by 
virtue of belonging to different nation-states. These constructed narratives (Anderson 1991, 6-7) 
are not natural facts, and as such a feeling of solidarity may well develop between members of the 
unbounded demos with expansive implementation of the all-subjected principle. 
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The third issue when it comes to the enfranchisement of subjected individuals is the scope 
of impact of decisions of the nation-state as well as capabilities for enfranchisement. The city-state 
I have imagined to be a relatively small polity that governs a relatively small territory and its 
decisions therefore will not impact the autonomy of a large amount of individuals at a given time. 
The nation-state on the other hand, especially in an era of globalisation, has the potential for its 
measures and policies to negatively impact the autonomy of a great number of individuals. Trade 
relations, diplomacy and territorial rights have the potential to subject far more individuals than they 
would in the city-state. Consider the nation-state of Saudi-Arabia wanting to limit its production of 
oil momentarily to raise the price in favour of its economic gain. In a globalised world economy this 
would negatively impact the autonomy of millions of people worldwide by altering the costs or 
income on which they depend for their livelihoods, and as such require their enfranchisement in the 
decision. This is, considering current methods of communication and democratic participation, a 
practical impossibility. As Abizadeh notes, the demos is in principle unbounded but at the same 
time practically constrained by the capacity of communicative decision-making practices to track 
the outward-extended reach of political power (2012, 881). As there currently is an imbalance 
between the reach of subjection to political power and the reach of decision-making practices in 
the nation-state towards non-nationals, this capacity must somehow be increased if the all-
subjected principle is to be implemented in a more expansive manner than it is today. This problem 
is more pressing for the nation-state and global democratic government than for the city-state 
whose smaller scope gives less warranty for enfranchisement as policies will most likely subject 
less individuals. Moreover, the Rousseauian formation of the general will allows subjection to be 
mitigated easier, as I have explained above. 
In conclusion, the implementation of the all-subjected principle is a difficult task in the 
nation-state, which is to some extent mirrored in contemporary states. In their current form, the 
enfranchisement of non-nationals is possible only on a small scale compared to the need for it. 
Moreover, the thinking of cultural-nationalism that supplies the common culture of the demos within 
the nation-state is an obstacle for enfranchisement of heterogeneous individuals. Changing the 
cultural-nationalist underpinnings of the nation-state will be necessary if the all-subjected principle 
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is to be implemented more, but that will according, to the founding principles of the nation-state, 
necessarily lead to a degeneration of democratic conditions such as solidarity. However, even if the 
nation-state becomes more receptive towards shifting demoi and non-national enfranchisement, 
the practical reach of democratic practices is dwarfed by the actual need for enfranchisement. 
Decisions about the economic and environmental policy for example subject a multitude of 
individuals that far outnumber the amount of them that can actually be enfranchised in the 
decision-making process. As such, the implementation of the all-subjected principle in the nation-
state remains limited both by the founding principles of the state-form and by actual possibilities for 
enfranchisement. 
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The Global Democracy
Now that I have examined the possibilities for implementation of the all-subjected principle 
in the Rousseauian city-state and the contemporary nation-state, it is time to expand the scope of 
political organisation and discuss a global democratic system. I shall discuss here a global 
democracy consisting of a government that rules a world where all individuals on the globe in its 
entirety have become one demos and function as one state bounded by the common denominator 
of human equality. That is not to say there are no lower levels of governance, because without 
these the system would not be manageable. Lower levels of governance in the global democracy 
can be similar to current units of governance, but they lack the undertones of nationhood and 
belonging that are present in contemporary states. It is not problematic for a group of individuals 
that associates with one another to have a specific place of residence, but that place is not 
inherently theirs simply because they associate with one another and that place. There is no longer 
an us-vs-them-dynamic between groups, as there exists in the system of nation-states. I shall 
elaborate on this below. The global demos intuitively is perfectly fitted to the all-subjected principle. 
After all, the boundaries or political objections that existed in the Rousseauian city-state and the 
nation-state are no longer present and the common denominator of human equality does not 
problematise enfranchisement. However, recall that the normative demos is in principle 
unbounded, but that this does not necessarily mean that actual demoi can only be legitimate when 
they face no borders. Rather these borders must be legitimised via the all-subjected principle 
(Abizadeh 2012, 880).
 This global democracy consists a level of government above current states or units of 
governance that would have coercive decision-making power over them and can thus enforce 
things like a global constitution and transnational courts. A directly elected global parliament would 
satisfy the all-subjected principle because every individual that can be subjected by its rulings will 
have a chance to influence the policy it makes. However, other kinds of democratic will-formation 
such as deliberative elements may still be desired, I shall discuss these more below. Moreover the 
supranational (for lack of a better word in a system without nations) power of the world government 
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giving it jurisdiction over individual states at a lower level allows it to enforce the implementation of 
the all-subjected principle when the individual state has not done so. This allows any member of 
the global demos to appeal for enfranchisement in ways that are not possible in the other two 
discussed systems because there is no higher authority in those. In the global democracy, 
disenfranchisement on the part of the state seems to be made impossible by the very nature of the 
global democracy. 
Before discussing in more detail the possibilities for implementation of the all-subjected 
principle in the global democracy, it is necessary to discuss some specifics of the global 
democratic system that I am imagining here. The first of these regards the metaphysical 
impossibility of a global demos, the second deals with the alleged similarity between a global 
democracy and the all-subjected principle itself. The criticism on the alleged impossibility of a 
global demos, and thus a global democratic government, comes down on the question of adversity 
in two ways. These are the belief that there needs to be an external other for a state to properly 
define the self, and that the state must be homogeneous for it to function (Schmitt 1988, 
13-14).These criticisms are as follows: a particularist thesis against a global identity and one 
against the functioning of democracy in heterogeneous societies. The latter of these I have 
discussed before, so I shall focus on the former. The argument that a state needs an ‘other’ to 
define the ‘self’ intuitively seems sensible, for these sorts of distinctions are common to interactions 
and also very present in the contemporary system of states. In a global demos, there would no 
longer be a possibility for individuals to experience an ‘other’ outside of their system, and thus 
substantive equality would lose its value because all are similar and there is no possibility of that 
not being the case (Mouffe 1997, 23-24). This criticism is however based on a misunderstanding of 
collective identity for individual identity. As Abizadeh argues, individual identity is indeed 
particularistic and thus needs an external other, but it does not logically follow that the same is true 
for collective identity (Abizadeh 2005, 47-49). Within a collective the recognition that allows one to 
associate with that collective can also happen with other individuals that are part of the collective 
but remain different still in some way. Recall I have argued before that cultures, and as such 
identities, face a problem of closure; no one individual ever possesses all the traits and 
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characteristics that are thought to be part of of that culture. That is why even in a collective identity 
such as would be formed in the global demos individuals can still find an ‘other’ that has different 
values or traits and allows them to associate with the global demos, even if that global demos lacks 
an equivalent demos in another state. A second part of the criticism is that that any equality to 
remain substantive or meaningful must contain a form of inequality by definition, because 
otherwise it lacks the possibility of that equality ever being absent and is thus not worth caring 
about. I believe this can be achieved even when all individuals are members of the global demos 
and thus politically equal by definition, for example through allusions to the future and the past. 
Contrasting the political equality of the members of the global demos to the tyrannical excesses of 
past rulers can serve this role as a reminder for the future, as could the looming threat of disasters 
of a global scale. As such, I do not believe a global demos is a metaphysical impossibility based on 
the impossibility to associate with it, or the fact universal application of equality would make it non-
substantive. 
The second point I wish to clarify is in relation to the similarity between a full application of 
the all-subjected principle (that is, its total implementation within a political system), and a global 
democratic system as I have described it. At first glance, the full implementation of the all-
subjected principle may well as effect have the establishment of democratic measures at the 
interstate or global level (Abizadeh 2012, 880). Then, is a global democratic system is not the 
effect of the full implementation of the all-subjected principle? This would make it a redundant 
question to judge the implementation of the all-subjected principle within that system. However, 
while there are similarities between these two, as both would result in the enfranchisement of all 
human beings, the global democratic system as I describe it here finds it origin in a prepolitical 
principle of humanity, that is to say that the basis upon which the demos is constituted is that all 
who are human must be a part of it (Bartelson 2008). Like the two systems I have discussed 
before, the global democratic government is based to some extent on a social-contract view (Agné 
2010 and Abizadeh 2012, 880), while the all-subjected principle takes political power as a given 
and proceeds from there. That does not mean that the all-subjected principle cannot arrive at a 
similar global demos, but its starting point differs. 
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This cosmopolitan prepolitical foundation, the common denominator of humanity that lies at 
the root of the global democracy as I discuss it here can potentially be an obstacle to the 
implementation of the all-subjected principle. This is because by making the cosmopolitan notion of 
humanity the principle upon which to base the demos is likewise a setting of boundaries, but simply 
at a different level. Instead of taking but one group of culture, it draws in all cultures but the 
principle remains the same, and is thus just as prepolitical (Näsström 2011, 126-128). To some 
extent then, even the global demos is in some way bounded, especially when established via a 
social contract. Note that the definition of the all-subjected principle that I use here does not specify 
humanity as a necessary condition for subjection to warrant a democratic say. I do not wish to 
engage in a discussion of the effects of the all-subjected principle on animals or future generations 
for example, but let us suppose that farm animals gain sentience and are suddenly capable of 
partaking in the democratic process. Within the global demos as I have described it they are not 
entitled to participate while the implementation of the all-subjected principle would demand that 
they are. This is naturally a somewhat absurd example that would have the same conclusion in the 
nation-state (and depending on the general will may be different in the city-state), but it goes to 
show that a global demos is not necessarily the same as total implementation of the all-subjected 
principle. 
While it is important to realise there is a difference between the full implementation of the 
all-subjected principle and the global demos, this state form is capable of implementing the 
principle to a great extent. Consider Abizadeh’s normative demos which perfectly encompasses all 
that a proper-functioning democracy requires (2012, 879-880), but which can never be fully 
represented by any actual demos in a democracy. However, the global demos certainly is the 
practical demos that approaches the normative ideal most closely. With every human 
encompassed in it, the risk of wrongful exclusion is very low (barring situations such as the absurd 
one described above). In the global democratic government as I have described it, every citizen 
can vote for elections concerning the global parliament and government and as such has a way to 
influence the general large-scale course of world politics. Moreover, through the lower levels of 
governance they are given votes about issues that directly concern them. If the citizens in what is 
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now The Netherlands are considering the placement of their dykes, there is no reason for the 
citizens in what is now Australia to be involved in that choice. If a citizen feels they have been 
wrongfully excluded from a decision based on the all-subjected principle, they can make an appeal 
to a court that can overrule these decisions. As such there is a great capacity for the 
implementation of the all-subjected principle, limited once again only by the reach of democratic 
practices and allowance for humans to communicate and make their voices heard. 
In conclusion, the global demos has a great capacity for the implementation of the all-
subjected principle. It would function via a global parliament for which each citizen has a vote and 
is thus capable of influencing the large-scale political course. Moreover, on the lower level citizens 
can make their voice heard regarding policies that subject them, and in case wrongful exclusion 
occurs a higher level of government is authorised to address this. Because this way every 
individual is part of the demos, wrongful exclusion is very unlikely, and when it occurs it can be 
tackled relatively simply. A global demos is also the make-up of people that would closest approach 
the normative demos of a perfect democracy because of its inclusionary nature and scope. 
However, it is important to note that a global democracy as described here and the full 
implementation of the all-subjected principle are not the same thing. Humanity as a prepolitical 
ground for the establishment of the demos is not the same as the all-subjected principle’s 
approach, nor would it be able to accommodate non-humans even if the all-subjected principle 
would call for this. A global government would still make decisions that require the enfranchisement 
of millions of people which will require immense effort, but because of the decentralised nature of 
the system coupled with strong central authority, the implementation of the all-subjected principle is 
possible to a great extent. 
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Implications of the All-Subjected Principle
In this chapter I wish to briefly discuss some of the implications the implementation of the 
all-subjected principle (to whatever extent that may be) will have on democracies in general. These 
are general observations not applying exclusively to one of three discussed systems but most likely 
to all of them in some degree. The general requirement of the all-subjected principle, which calls 
for the enfranchisement of people that are not part of the state but are subjected to it, and the role 
of the state that is ordinarily thought to have legitimacy in making a decision will require a shift in 
mindset in the first place. This applies in the Rousseauian city-state and in the nation-state, while 
the global demos in general will require such a shift more significantly to be viable. The proposal 
that unilateral border declarations should involve those excluded from the territory as well 
(Abizadeh 2008) is met already with skepticism from philosophers, and even greater skepticism 
would come from politicians or current citizens of states. The dominant Westphalian way of 
thinking about the role of the state and sovereignty will have to change if the implementation of the 
all-subjected principle is to become a success in any governmental system (Abizadeh 2005, 
46-49). 
Not only our thinking about the way democracy functions must change, it is likely that a 
change in democratic practices is also warranted. Throughout the discussion of the three separate 
forms of government and their capacity for the implementation of the all-subjected principle, I have 
often spoken of the right of citizens to vote. Considering the complexities of the policies at hand, as 
well as the need for enfranchisement of a great number of individuals in the nation-state and the 
global government, it is likely that certain kinds of direct democracy become practiced to a more 
often than they are now. Consider the nation-state first, where the implementation of the all-
subjected principle is quite problematic, by way of an example of a current state. Imagine that The 
Netherlands attempts to improve its legitimacy by involving those influenced by our fishing policies 
in their construction. This happens through the EU, but not all those subjected to Dutch fishing 
policies are part of the EU, for example, Norway. The Netherlands is a representative democracy, 
and therefore its citizens determine their stance on the fishing policies by voting for a party that 
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holds a certain opinion vis-a-vis this problem. Would the state then require all those subjected to 
our fishing policies to vote in a general election? That would allow them to exert influence not only 
over the fishing policy, but also on the amount of benefits an unemployed person in The 
Netherlands receives, something not warranted by the all-subjected principle. In a global demos, 
the number of issues that subject individuals is so great it could never be handled by the global 
government itself, so here referendums on specific issues are also likely to occur. Thus, it can be 
expected that referendums and other forms of direct democracy become more commonplace when 
the all-subjected principle is implemented to a greater extent than it is now and has a sufficiently 
significant implementation. It should be noted that this is not a necessarily warranted by the all-
subjected principle, which deals with the composition of the demos, not the execution of the state. 
However, given the effects implementation of the all-subjected principle will have on the demos 
(and most likely on the state), I believe these developments are reasonable assumptions. 
In the Rousseauian city-state this functions differently. After all, the formation of the general 
will by the citizens occurs via a system that is reminiscent not only of direct democracy but also of 
deliberative democracy. As I have explained the Rousseauian city-state can remain relatively 
small-scale even when implementing the all-subjected principle through negotiation with other city-
states on specific issues as well as the will of good citizens to have a democracy that is as 
legitimate as possible by enfranchisement. Deliberative democracy can also be a useful tool for the 
other two systems that I have discussed to tackle the challenge of enfranchisement of large groups 
of individuals. It can be a powerful alternative for representative democracies that seek to 
enfranchise current non-citizens, and in general allow constituents to grapple with policy decisions 
of a complex nature. 
Likewise, the implementation of the all-subjected principle and the different ways of thinking 
about and practicing democracy that they most likely require will need to be complemented by 
strong democratic institutions. In the global democratic system citizens will have to make decisions 
not only regarding their own situation but also in regards to the general political direction, 
something that will be more difficult than the current national direction given its increased scope. 
Moreover, not every individual will have the same knowledge and understanding of affairs, but in 
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order for each of them to make an informed decision this is desirable and thus justifies the 
involvement of robust democratic institutions. In the city-state and the nation-state, individuals that 
are enfranchised in a decision will have to be made aware of how the system they are 
enfranchised into functions and works, while its current members will have to come to terms with 
the injection of individuals into the demos that were not before. Finally, another reason strong 
institutions are necessary is that subjection will most likely differ per policy or law enacted, and as 
such the groups of individuals that must be enfranchised in the decision will shift constantly. For 
example, in a global democratic system each citizen will vote in the global election, but the 
electorate for smaller issue will differ. 
The implementation of the all-subjected principle as I have described it not only demands a 
change in the practices of specific political systems, but will most likely also have an impact on our 
ideas about democracy in general. For example, the general way of thinking about democracy is 
very state-centric and regards sovereignty as important. If the implementation of the all-subjected 
principle is to be successful, a change of paradigm must occur in this regard, which is partially why 
the principle cannot be implemented significantly in a nation-state. Moreover, different methods of 
democracy other than just representative party systems will have to be adopted. A representative 
democracy cannot properly enfranchise subjected individuals in some decisions but leave them out 
of others if its only means of formal democratic participation consists of voting in elections. Direct 
democracy or deliberative democracy in this case can help the enfranchised individuals and 
existing citizens articulate their preferences in a fair manner. Finally, political systems that attempt 
to implement the all-subjected principle to the greatest extent possible will be helped greatly by 
having robust democratic institutions to moderate the process and ensure that the collection of 
constituents can make an informed decisions on these complex matters. 
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Conclusion
I have attempted in this research to answer the question of to what extent different political 
systems could implement the all-subjected principle as an answer to the problematisation of the 
constitution of the demos through the boundary problem, considering the founding principles of 
those political systems. Essentially, the query relates to the practical application of the all-subjected 
principle internal to the system. I have opted not to review its application or use it as a prepolitical 
principle because this would lead to a binary question of legitimacy, the answer to which would 
most likely be that no polity currently in existence is fully legitimate. Instead I have wondered how 
political systems can become as legitimate as possible using the all-subjected principle. The three 
chosen political systems, the Rousseauian city-state, the nation-state and a form of global 
democratic government, each have a different scope of democracy and a different foundation that 
justifies them. These justifications are relevant to incorporate in the inquiry, because the all-
subjected principle itself is one of democratic legitimacy, not state-formation. Because it treats 
power as a given and then seeks to justify its exercise over individuals, using it as a principle of 
state-formation will yield a state that does not fit our current understanding of that term. 
In the literature review I have outlined the central notions of this research and 
contextualised the debate currently existing about the boundary problem, the role of democratic 
legitimacy and the solutions that are proposed to the boundary problem. I have examined these 
solutions and selected the all-subjected principle as the most convincing, because it provides a 
useful account of the legitimisation of power and approaches the problem in a convincing temporal 
manner. Others, such as the cultural-nation do not satisfy as a solution because they fail to give a 
ground for legitimacy, while others such as compensation are plagued by difficulties in execution. 
Solutions which either accept the boundary problem as part of any democracy or believe the 
democratic process will eventually solve it are neither convincing as they either erode the moral 
content of democracy, or put unwarranted trust in historical processes. The all-affected principle is 
similar to the all-subjected principle but at the end fails to give an intrinsic account of democratic 
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legitimacy but solely an instrumental reason for enfranchisement and therefore does not give a 
satisfying answer to the boundary problem. 
The all-subjected principle entails “that all those subjected to the exercise of political power 
be included in the demos, i.e., granted a right of democratic say over political decisions” (Abizadeh 
2012, 878). It is closely related to the notion of autonomy, if one’s autonomy is violated without that 
person having influence upon the democratic process, this gives raise to a claim for 
enfranchisement in a given decision. It should be noted the all-subjected principle does not furnish 
a prepolitical principle for the constitution of the demos, but rather a constant check to see to what 
extent a constituted demos is legitimate by enfranchising all those that should be enfranchised. 
Thus, the greater the extent of the implementation of the principle, the more legitimate the 
democracy in which it is implemented. 
The implementation of the all-subjected principle in the Rousseauian city-state is possible 
to great extent. This partially has to do with the way the Rousseauian social contract is similar to 
the way individuals are enfranchised into the demos. Moreover, the good citizens of the city-state 
that make good laws and create a general will that is as just as possible to all will want to create a 
state that is as legitimate as possible. Specifically to the all-subjected principle that will mean 
enfranchisement of those still living in a state of nature outside the city-state. Interactions with 
other city-states can be solved through negotiation in accordance with to the all-subjected 
principle. Recall that the Sovereign acts according to the general will, that is willed by all citizens. 
Therefore, whenever the Sovereign comes to terms with another Sovereign on a matter, the wills of 
all citizens are satisfied and the all-subjected principle is implemented to its greatest extent. 
The nation-state has greater difficulty implementing the all-subjected principle. This is due 
to the influence of the national idea behind the state, where the nation exists of individuals that 
share a common culture or background. However, culture faces a number of problems of clarity 
that render it problematic to use as a foundation. Implicit is the argument that a state without a 
properly homogenous nation behind it is not capable of upholding democratic values. The 
administrative system of nation-states, as well as its specific form of democracy that is tied to 
citizenship and nationhood makes enfranchisement of non-nationals a difficult task. This is caused 
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by the fact that the nation-state not only makes demands of the functioning of the state, but also to 
some extent of the demos that must live there. Moreover, the policies and thus the subjection of 
individuals that the nation-state enacts stands in no comparison to its ability to enfranchise. 
Because sovereignty is such a central concept to nation-states and a higher authority is lacking 
appeals about wrongful exclusion cannot meaningfully be filed, nor can a single nation-state reach 
all the individuals it ought to enfranchise in a global society and economy where policies can have 
significant outreach. Therefore, the nation-state only has a limited capacity for the implementation 
of the all-subjected principle. These problems for implementation are shared by contemporary 
states. While they are more pluralistic, elements of nationhood are still present and the concept of 
sovereignty makes enfranchisement problematic. For the capacity for enfranchisement to be 
greater, the ideas of the cultural-nation must be disassociated from the state, which would violate 
the founding principles of the nation-state. 
Finally, the global democratic government has a significant capability to implement the all-
subjected principle. This is because a global demos comes closest to the normative demos of a 
perfect democracy as exclusion is almost impossible on the level of global politics. If it does occur 
at a lower level of governance, a higher level can take action to solve the issue. Moreover, citizens 
can influence policy both at the global level and at the local level, the former being open to all and 
the latter to all subjected by that specific decision. A total implementation of the all-subjected 
principle does not however equate to a global demos. The global democratic government is based 
on the prepolitical principle of humanity, which still assumes the demos as bounded but simply 
applies the boundary around humans instead of between them. Therefore, conceptually not even 
the global demos can ever fully implement the all-subjected principle. In the case of the subjection 
of sentient non-humans, the all-subjected principle would warrant a case for inclusion where the 
global democratic system would not.
I have also discussed some implications the implementation of the all-subjected principle 
would have for our conceptions and practice of democracy that relate to most of these systems. 
First of all our thinking about democracy needs to become untangled from the state with its borders 
and us-vs-them inclinations. The implementation of the all-subjected principle will at times (unless 
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in a global demos) call for the enfranchisement of individuals that are not currently part of one’s 
demos, and as a result demoi will come to fluctuate more. Secondly, there will be the need to 
employ more direct democratic practices, especially for representative democracies that will 
otherwise have difficulties justly enfranchising individuals for single decisions. Deliberative 
democracy is also an option to increase the knowledge of constituents to make an informed 
decision on complex matters or domains they never before were engaged in. Thirdly, robust 
democratic institutions are required in any political system that implements the all-subjected 
principles because of the change it will mean to its current situation.These last two points are most 
relevant to the complexity of decisions and policies in a global democratic system. 
In conclusion, it seems that the implementation of the all-subjected principle indeed differs 
in the three chosen political systems. The nation-state has the lowest capacity for implementation 
of the three because of its reliance on sovereignty and the nation behind the state. The 
Rousseauian city-state and the global democratic government both have means of implementing 
the principle to a great extent, through negotiation and the general will by the former and by a 
global demos which makes exclusion nigh impossible by the latter. However, for the all-subjected 
principle to be implemented in systems our thinking about democracy itself must change as well. 
This makes it doubtful that the all-subjected principle will ever become a practical measure of 
democratic legitimacy. 
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